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On March 6, 1995, the European Union and Tukey agreed, under the terms of the Association 
Agreement signed in Ankara in 1963, to launch a customs union between them from the beginning of 
1996. However, the starting date which is likely be delayed six months, is dependent on two processes 
 
- a technical review by the European Commission on whether Turkey has completed its mainly 
legislative preparations. 
- the assent of the European Parliament which is showing a determinant sensitivity on human rights 
and democracy reforms in Turkey. 
 
The EU-Turkey Association Council decision of March 6 is supplemented by a resolution on the 
development of high-level political dialogue between the parties and a financial cooperation package 
of 375 million ecus. The customs union covers the following areas: 
 
Foreign  trade     Abolition  of  tariff  and  non-tariff  barriers 
          Common Customs Tariff towards third countries 
      Custom  code 
      Liberalization  of  trade  in  agro-industrial  products 
 
Legislative harmonization    Competition policy 
      Intellectual  and  Industrial  property  protection 
      Rules  on  state  aids 
      Public  procurement  procedures 
      S t a n d a r d s  
      Environmental  policy 
      Agricultural  policy 
 
Whereas, for Turkey, the customs union represents a step towards full-membership of the EU, seen 
from Brussels it is economically a major extension of the European single market and politically a 
much needed answer to the geo-strategic challenge of reenforcing Turkey's European linkage. 
 
Actual Debate on the Enlargement of the European Union 
 
Discussing the prospects for EU-Turkey relations today implies to focus on the new era of this . 
relationship beyond the technical achievement of the customs union. A dynamic analysis should 
consider the prospects for EU-Turkey relations on the basis of different development perspectives of 
the European integration process. We can try to generalize and simplify these perspectives in three 
basic scenarios on the future of the European Union: 
 
1) Federal Europe 
 
In this scenario, the europeification of national policy-making and the supranational/federal 
characteristics of the EU decision-making (such as widening of the majority voting in stead of the 
unanimity at the Council of Ministers, transformation of the European Parliament to a real legislative 
power, transition to monetary union etc.) are deepened. The main obstacle for this federal model is the 
challenge to go beyond the existing national political, economic and cultural divergences and to define 
a coherent notion of "common European interest". 
 
Moreover the recent enlargement of the Union to three EFTA countries and its political commitment 
for full-membership of Central and Eastern European countries by the year 2000 (1) re-enforce the 
complexity of a negotiation process between fifteen to twenty-five governments. 
 On the other hand, there is almost a consensus - at least an overwhelming majority - approving the 
analysis on the inefficiency of policy and decision-making within an enlarged European Union unless 
its supranational/federal characteristics are generated (2). 
 
2) Confederal Union 
 
The second scenario is a Europe of States, where the member countries continue to play the main role 
in the decision-making process which remains mainly intergovernmental. This would, in practical 
terms mean a total failure of the 1996 intergovernmental conference on the institutional reform. 
 
However a significant integration process seems today unrealistic because the economic and social 
forces of integration are strong. This becomes especially clear where the need for European 
competitiveness in a global perspective is concerned and when we consider the challenges stemming 
from the economic and democratic transition in Eastern Europe. 
 
In addition, several countries would hesitate to accept Germany as an uncommited and fully 
independent political and economic force in Europe. 
 
3) Variable Geometry Europe 
 
The third scenario is a Europe of variable geometry in which there are several levels of integration 
around a hard core composed by countries which are technically most able to go for deeper economic 
integration and politically committed in being part of a federal entity. 
 
This model is the most practical one from a political perspective even if it cannot be qualified as a 
coherent alternative from an institutional point of view. The predominance of legal tradition in the 
study of EU decision-making has created a bias towards formal aspects. This legal tradition projects a 
concept of integration as an orderly system with a single body of law. 
 
In any case, some members may not meet the Maastricht Treaty's convergence criteria for the third 
stage of the Economic and Monetary Union by 1999. Moreover a certain degree of à la carte 
membership is already existing: the UK and Denmark have opt-outs with regard to the Monetary 
Union. Add to that UK's opt-out for social policy and Denmark's clarification as far as the European 
citizenship is concerned. There are also important multi-speed Europe aspects on the other fields of 
integration outside the EU's legal framework, such as the Western European Union within which some 
EU countries have only an observer status, the Euro-corps initiative - the nucleus of a future European 
army - with the participation of only six EU member countries the Schengen Agreement among nine 
EU members on the internal security affairs, etc.. 
 
Naturally, an evolution towards a multi-speed Europe will cause problems for the decision-making 
structure of the European Union. It is likely that fully integrated hard core countries will have greater 
influence than less integrated countries. The institutional confusion is also due to different opinions in 
each country and different models concerning the role of the state and the European integration. 
 
The idea of multi-speed Europe was a political taboo in the EU until last September when the French 
government and German main coalition partner (CDU/CSU) expressed respectively their vision of 
Europe's future characterized as a variable geometry with the aim to prevent a de facto and disorderly 
evolution towards an à la carte EU membership. First, French Prime Minister Eduard Balladur raised 
the old idea of a Europe of concentric circles with Franco-German alliance and some other countries at 
the center. Shortly afterwards German Christian Democrats made a similar proposal in great detail, 
mentioning undiplomatically and courageously the likely members of the hard core: Germany, France 
and the Benelux countries. Both proposals from Paris and Bonn, indicated that the future European 
Union could be arranged around a core of countries which pool their sovereignty and push towards a 
single currency, single central bank a highly coordinated common economic policy, single voice in the 
international relations and a common defence policy. 
 Outside the hard core would be ranged a second circle of countries for which the obligations of EU 
membership would remain at more or less their present level, to include participation in the common 
agricultural policy, the single market, structural funds to help poorer regions and so on. The variable 
geometry Europe model sees each country as a welcome future member of the inner hard core when it 
is ready to apply. Another outer circle would contain aspirant states namely the Mediterranean and 
Central and Eastern European associated members of the Union. Beyond this circle, there will still be 
countries having trade and cooperation agreements with the EU. 
 
Of course, the development of the European integration process in the coming years will depend on 
several factors among which we can list: 
1 - the institutional reforms necessary in an enlarged European Union with the aim to increase the 
efficiency and the democratic quality of the decision-making process, 
2 - the new policy consensus which will be defined after the participation of new member, 
3 - the success of implementation of European citizenship concept and the subsidiary principle which 
is due to define the levels of competence and intervention between the local, regional national and 
supranational authorities. 
4 - the dynamics between the supra-nationalization and the decentralization process, 
5 - the evolution of the global and European economic conjuncture, etc... 
 
With the arrival of three new members (Austria, Sweden and Finland), EU's commitment to 
enlargement to Central and Eastern European countries and the lack of a common vision for future, we 
can argue today that the break-up of the EU's present monolithic structure seems more than ever 
inevitable 
 
As far as Turkey's eventual membership is concerned, we see that the most important element of the 
analysis is not yet determined: that is the future political nature of the integration process in which 
Turkey would take place as a full-member. 
 
The basic question is the following: On which European Union are we basing our prospects, a federal 
one? or a purely intergovernmental international organization of a free trade area?, or an integration 
process of variable geometry? 
 
We can carry on the debate on the Turkish candidacy from a less dynamic but functional point of view, 
with a check-list on the EU-membership capability of applicant country(3). 
 
Checklist on the EU-Membership capability of Applicant Countries 
 
Preliminary remarks: 
 
1- To work with a check-list can be helpful for further academic comparative research as well as for 
political and economic orientations. 
2- When we analyze the EU documents on the enlargements we observe that there has been no ranging 
list yet about which dimension or criterion is the most important nor is there a minimum standard set. 
3- The dimensions of the check-list are oriented as well on the pre-conditions for becoming a full 
member as on possible consequences. 
4- A deeper debate on enlargement implies a more dynamic approach which emphasizes the interaction 
between the pre-conditions and the consequences. 
5- All present EU members could be scrutinized by this check list. 
 
In the check list there are 4 membership dimensions: 
 
1 DEMOCRATIC RELIABILITY 
 
2 FULFILLING THE "ACQUIS"(4) 
 
3 OPENNESS TOWARDS THE "FINALITÉ POLITIQUE"(5)  
4 EUROPEAN IDENTITY 
 
 
1 DEMOCRATIC RELIABILITY 
 
As to democratic reliability of an applicant country there are generally four criteria mentioned which 
are obviousky closely related: 
 
1 - Existence of a parliamentary democracy and trends towards a more decentralized administrative 
political structure; 
2 - Respect of human and civil rights 
3 - A respective social and political infrastructure, such as free trade unions, freedom of the press etc... 
4 - A political culture open to accept the factors of differentiation in the society as a positive 
contribution to country's richness 
 
Turkey is constitutionally a secular parliamentary democracy with an experience which has its roots in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
 
Despite the ruptures of the Turkish democracy experience in the past by military takeovers and the 
practice of repression on the pro-Soviet communist movements during the cold war years, today there 
is no doubt that Turkey has the main characteristics of a democratic country: 
 
- more than fifteen active political parties from far-left to far right; 
- alternance between democratically elected Parliaments and governments in total conformity with the 
republican and secular Constitution; 
- growing political support for a decentralization reform; 
- a stable legal framework for social dialogue between the representatives of workers' and employers' 
organizations 
- a very heterogeneous and colorful press world and an audio-visual panorama composed by hundreds 
of private radio stations and television networks both on national and local scales,... 
 
However, it is also true that Turkish democracy has to be consolidated by more efficient improvements 
on the field of human rights. In this sense, the Turkish media world, the principal source of reports on 
Turkey by the Amnesty International, the workers', employers' and business organizations and the 
public opinion in general exercise a very significant pressure on the legislative process in order to go 
beyond the political and bureaucratic deadlocks. The further integration of Turkey to Europe is a major 
factor of progress strengthening the portion of those who are fighting in favor of Turkey's gradual and 
determined fulfilling of her democratic deficits. 
 
Kurdish question: 
 
Turkish democracy's consolidation question is generally identified with the Kurdish question for which 
the Turkish public opinion has shown a very high degree of sensitiveness and caution. This attitude can 
not be explained superficially by nationalism alone. Understanding the Kurdish question and its effects 
on the EU-Turkey relations implies to take into account some determinant elements of analysis which 
are most of time ignored by the some European media and Institutions like the European Parliament: 
 
1) This is not a typical question of minority. 
 
The minority status in Turkey is legally established for Jewish, Greek and Armenian communities 
whose rights are governed by the Lausanne Treaty of 1924 (the Jewish community renounced its 
minority status in 1928). All other Turkish citizens are subject to same legal regime without distinction 
of ethnical or geographical origin. 
 Turkey has been throughout its history a crossroads for as many as the Hittites, the Ionians, the 
Likyans to the Romans, the Byzantines, the Oguz Turks to have settled in Anatolia and Thrace and the 
peoples of Balkans who were subject to very significant migratory movements after the world wars. 
 
When, after 100 years of westward migration from Central Asia, the Oguz Turks began to settle in 
Anatolia in the 11 th century, they had already mixed with several peoples living in today's Russian 
Federation or Iranian territories. Then, during centuries they were mixed with the other peoples in 
Anatolia and in the Balkans, creating ethnic as well as culturally, a heterogeneous society under the 
rule of the multi-ethnical Ottoman Empire. Modern Turkish Nation was to become a mixture of at least 
forty ethnical and sub-ethnical origins(6). 
 
2) The concept of "Turkish Nation" does not exclude, neither ideologically nor legally, the Kurdish 
component of the modern Turkish society. 
 
The Ottoman Empire did not experience an important industrial revolution, the emergence of a 
powerful bourgeoisie and the birth of a Nation-State. The latter was only established in 1923 when the 
Republic was founded. It was only towards the end of the 19th century that the Ottoman elites had 
discovered nationalism. Before, the word Turk(7) signified "a peasant, somebody from the 
mountains"(8), although it was used by Europeans to qualify the Ottomans. As a corollary, one of the 
priorities of the Kemalist revolution was to establish the sentiment "to be Turkish" on Anatolian 
peoples' minds. The state's ideology, officially and in practice, has been to consider that the criterion of 
being a Turk is to say: "I am Turkish". The common character of mixed marriages, the very 
heterogeneous ethnical profile of the ruling elites and the absence of any official instrument of ethnical 
identification(9) have contributed to the Nation-building process. The main pillars of this policy were, 
on the one hand, national education and the Turkish language (just as in the different cases of French 
and American experiences) and, on the other hand, social and economic development and political 
participation. 
 
The Republic's nation-building policy has been successful to a very large extent, rapidly creating a 
common ground for the development of a strong Turkish identity. But, while this success concerned 
particularly those parts of society which have enjoyed social mobility(10), in the rural areas, the 
national consciousness has developed very slowly as a result of economic backwardness. While the 
rural exodus to large Turkish and Western European cities since the 50's has provided for impressive 
social opportunities for some immigrants, a low degree of cultural integration at the "center" has raised 
the intricate problem of social integration 
 
3) Separating or isolating a Kurdish factor on ethnical and geographical terms is a very complex 
decision and can hardly be justified as a constructive and peace-seeking approach in the case of 
modern Turkey. 
 
In this respect a particular emphasis should be placed on the very important parameter depictng the 
social backgrounds of the political, academic and other influential people discussing the Kurdish 
question in Turkey. A majority of them belongs to first or second generation of immigration which 
multiplied by a factor of between 10 and 20 the population of three major Tukish cities in the last fifty 
years. They usually have a sub-national identity qualified either by a geographical region (different 
regions of the Balkans, the Black Sea, Egean regions, Eastern Anatolia etc.) or by an ethnical 
appellation (Laz, Georgian, Kurdish, Abkazian, Tatar, Albanian Bosnian, Cerkoz etc.). They mostly 
have more than one term of ethnical identification as a result of mixed marriages. 
 
This characteristic of the leading groups in Turkish society, considered together with the Turkish 
identity's historical background, explains the structural complexity underlying the debate on the 
Kurdish question. An important element of the analysis is to observe that, while a very important 
number of people of Kurdish origin(11) has been integrated into the national development process, the 
region which has remained most peripheral as regards the "Center" is the southern part of Eastern 
Anatolia which also has the largest concentration of Kurdish people; a region which for a long time 
was considered too unfertile and unstable for investment by both Ankara and its inhabitants. Any movement, social or political, stemming from that region was, in the eyes of the "Center", a challenge 
to the nation-building process as well as to unity and sovereignty and was therefore repressed. The 
situation in this region is rather complicated when we take into account the social mobility within that 
region where no ethnical identification instruments or practices legally exist. In adition the existence of 
pre-capitalistic semi-feudal social structures in some areas and of several sectarian religious activities 
contribute to the interlocking diversification of the political landscape. 
 
4) Kurdish question can not be understood in a simplistic "bad and good guys" logic. 
 
The first reaction of the Turkish authorities to PKK terrorism - which has grown rapidly since 1982 - 
was of course repression, as any other state would do in such a case. Nevertheless the anti-terrorist 
policy was not sufficiently accompanied by a search for social and economic causes of Southeastern 
Anatolia's troubled society and has created a permanent "extraordinary situaton" distressing the daily 
life of people, whether of Kurdish or non Kurdish origins. 
 
Indeed, the state spends seven times more than what it receives from this region as a contribution to its 
budget and is carrying out one of the largest and most comprehensive regional development projects in 
the wodd, financing it exclusively by domestic resources. The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) 
covers six provinces which represent 9.5% of the total national territory and 8.5% of the total 
population. The project has already become partly operational and includes giant irrigation tunnels, 21 
dams and 17 hydro-electric power plants on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. It is planned that upon 
completion by the year 2001, over 1.6 million ha of land will be irrigated multiplying by 20 the 
regional agricultural production and doubling national electricity generation. 
 
When a center-right/center-left coalition government took office in December 1991, Mr. Demirel, then 
Prime Minister declared that he recognizes the "Kurdish reality". That means assuming the socio-
economically peripheral situation of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin living in Southeastern Anatolia 
and adopting an appropriate policy. In this respect, changes are introduced progressively on the 
legislation, abolishing the laws which were interpreted in order to repress the expression of the Kurdish 
identity. For example, research institutes or publications in different dialects of the Kurdish languages 
or on the Kurdish world are no longer seen directly as a threat to national unity. However, the 
government's policy has not yet reached a point of equilibrium between the fight against terrorism and 
the concern to avoid creating a climate of repression in the daily life of that region. 
 
5) The PKK terrorism whose victims are mainly civilian people of South-East Anatolia, is a major 
obstacle for an immediate solution of the Kurdish question. 
 
In the modern World, the fight against terrorism is a crucial challenge for govemments, especially for a 
country like Turkey. In fact, three neighbors of Turkey are among the six countries(12) listed by the 
USA as supporting the international terrorism. The Marxist-Leninist Kurdish Workers Party's (PKK) 
terrorist actions are sponsored principally by drug and arms trafficking networks in the Middle East 
and Western Europe. It is also very surprising to observe that this organization, while being outlawed 
and repressed in Germany and France, enjoys an operational freedom in an another EU member 
country, in Greece. The German newspaper Die Welt reported even on the PKK training camps in 
Greek territory (October 1994). 
 
Unfortunately, the European Union's public opinion is not enough informed on the consequences of the 
PKK terrorism whose targets are major school teachers, medical staff, shopping centers...  For example 
it is curious that the massacre of four young women school teachers and three doctors along side 
several peasants of a village is not considered as "a news" by the majority of media networks in the 
European Union whereas the same day's other terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka or by the Shining Path in 
Peru are transmitted in first place by these same public information organizations. 
 
6) The trial of some members of the Turkish Parliament, subject to very explicit critics within the 
Turkish public opinion and political circles, is condemned by the European Parliament in a resolution 
which was based on misinformation and lack of complete analysis on the Kurdish question.  
First of all, although these eight deputies are members of a party which is more specifically 
representng a Kurdish identity, there are many more deputies in the Parliament (around hundred and 
fifty deputies of the Turkish Parliament are from the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia) and 
ministers in the actual government of Kurdish origin as well. 
 
Secondly, pursuant to the Court's verdict the eight deputies have not been sentenced because of 
expressing their cultural identity, nor because of performing their constitutional duties as it is stated in 
European Parliaments resolution. The Court sentenced eight deputies on charges of providing the PKK 
with logistic support, but it dropped the political charge of treason. 
 
Finally, as stated by Turkish Foreign Minster in a press conference in Brussels (19 December 1994), 
the government hopes that the appeal procedure to the High Court and if still necessary to the 
European Commission of Human Rights in Strassbourg will result in a politically less controversial 
solution of the case. 
 
2 FULFILLING THE ACQUIS 
 
A second crucial test for membership is the capability of a country to really fulfill all the obligations 
and rights put down in the primary and secondary laws and rules of the Community and related 
policies in lato sensu the fulfilling the acquis dimension covers four domains: 
 
1- Economic maturity 
2- Legal and administrative order 
3- Common Foreign and Security Policy 
4- Political and administrative human capital 
5- Public opinion support 
 
1- Economic maturity 
 
The first criterion of this dimensuon might be called economic maturity to be measured with the help 
of traditional statistics for the competitiveness and the performance of the economy. On the other hand, 
the question of the cost of a new membership on EU's budget as far as the common agricultural policy 
and the structural funds for economic and social cohesion are concerned, is very hypothetical to 
discuss today, since the next enlargements will take place in the years 2000 in a very different 
economic context characterized probably by some form of a variable geometry Europe(13). 
 
Moreover the membership to the EU is, as a process, governed by transitional periods and dispositions 
for the sake of necessary economic and legislative adaptation. On the other hand, as a target, the EU 
membership is a determinant mobilizing factor for the applicant country's reputation as being 
"economically foreseeable" and its integration to the Single European Market. 
 
Since the issue in December 1989, of the EC Commission's Opinion on Turkey's apparition for full-
membership which stated the country's eligibility to become a member of the Community while 
stressing a number of problem areas, especially on economic terms there has been a historic 
transformation both in Turkey and in Europe. 
 
Whereas the integration factors between Turkey and the Community were, at the beginning, mainly 
geo-strategical - with special reference to the security aspects - today, they are also significantly 
economic and political: 
 
In fact, on terms of EU documents which preceded the decision to re-launch the process towards a 
customs union in 1992(14), Turkey constitutes a pole of attraction in the new Europe for several 
reasons: 
 First, as of 1993, Turkey is a significant industrial and military power in the region between Europe 
and South Asia. In geo-strategic terms Turkey has become a pivot of the whole Black Sea/Eastern 
Mediterranean region. 
 
In this sense, we can list: 
 
- Turkey's special relationship with the Turkish speaking republics of the CIS, 
- the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Forum launched by Ankara, 
- Economic Cooperation Organization between Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics 
of the CIS, 
- Turkey's potential role in functional regional cooperation schemes (based on trade water and energy 
supply, etc.) in an extended Middle East peace process 
- and the free trade agreement web EFTA. 
 
Secondly, in the same region, Turkey has emerged as a "model" of parliamentary democracy and free 
market economy, two closely interrelated elements in the new World. Her democratic experience, 
although perturbed three times in the past and not yet perfect has its roots in the late 19th and early 
20th century, which makes it relatively long even comparing with some members of the European 
Union. 
 
Thirdly, Turkey is the EU's main trading partner in the Euro-Mediterranean area and in the Eurasian 
axis. 
 
A few statistics would make the point: 
 
- In 1980, Turkey was the 44th supplier of the Community with an export figure of 1.2 billion dollars. 
- Today, she is the nineteenth supplier with 7.6 billion dollars. This corresponds to a six fold increase. 
 
- Likewise, in 1980, Turkey was ranking as the 26th country, with an import figure of 2.1 billion 
dollars from the Community. 
- Today she is the tenth main Community market with an import figure of 10.5 billion dollars. 
- TR-EU trade volume is estimated to having hit the 20 billion dollars mark by the end of 1994. 
 
In other words, Turkey has moved up from the EU's 48th trading partner in the World in 1980 to 11th 
position in 1992 and has the potential to become even more important figure in the very near future 
taking into consideration the present trends and the new phase of EU-Turkey integration process. 
 
Finally, Turkey is an attractive private investment partner in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea 
regions for the EU. Since 1988, direct investment in Turkey, largely from the Community, has 
increased by 1.8 billion dollars, corresponding to more than 8 to 10 times the amount which has gone 
to Israel, and 2 to 5 times what has gone to southern Mediterranean countries. 
 
With the completion of the customs union by 1996: 
 
- First of all Turkey hopes to become an ever more attractive partner for European business. As the 
only third country, besides Andorra, to have a customs union with the EU, Turkey will be obliged to 
adopt a large part of the Union's regulatory framework; thus, a legal and administrative order will be in 
place to promote more economic integration of Turkey to the European Union. 
 
- Secondly, completing the customs union will not only offer to the EU enterprises a better access to a 
rapidly growing broad and modern market but it will also lead the modernization of Turkish industrial 
machinery as well as administrative, technological and structural changes in industry and services as 
Turkey tries to align with the EU in terms of competitiveness. 
 
Of course the dynamism of the Turkish economy can not let us to argue that "Turkey is ready to join 
the EU as soon as possible".  
Neither is it in the interest of Turkey to join the EU as soon as possible. 
 
However, taking into consideration: 
 
- the usual dispositions of the accession treaties (EU membership agreements) that provide for 
transitional periods 
 
- and the perspective of the achievement of EU-Tr customs union and beyond, 
 
we can conclude that: 
 
on terms of economic maturity Turkey is not behind the other candidates to EU membership, beside 
the remaining members of EFTA (Norway, Iceland and Switzerland). 
 
In fact, whereas Turkey-EU customs union is technical ready to be effective by 1996 according to 
Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan (press conference in Brussels, 19 December 1994), the association 
agreements between the EU and the Central and Eastern European countries foresee only the gradual 
establishment of a free trade area which represents a lesser degree of integration than a customs union. 
 
2 - Legal and administrative order 
 
A second criterion for taking up all obligations and - even more - for profiting from all rights can be 
defined as an adequate legal and administrative apparatus of new members. 
 
The legal acts of the Community (around 2000) have to be properly implemented and applied if they 
should serve their purposes. 
 
Already within the Community of Twelve, the "sinners list" of the EC Commission was clearly 
indicating the shortcomings and important deficiencies of almost all the member states. 
 
As far as Turkey is concerned the final stage of her association agreement with the EU - which will 
begin by the completion of the customs union - is set forth to be the phase of the harmonization of the 
Turkish legal order with the Union's acquis (legal patrimony) especially with respect to the competition 
law and to other economic domains. 
 
The legal bases of the EC-Turkey association are the Ankara agreement of 1963 concluded under the 
terms of the article 238 of the Rome Treaty, and its Additional Protocol, signed in Brussels in 1970 and 
entered into force in 1973. 
 
The Ankara Agreement creates reciprocal rights and obligations. The agreement and decisions taken 
within the framework of the association regime are part of the EC's acquis (legal patrimony) and 
directly enter force in the member states' national orders. The principal objective of the agreement is to 
promote the development of trade and economic relations between the parties and to prepare Turkey's 
full membership to the Community. 
 
In order to pave the way for Turkey's integration to the Community, the association regime requires the 
gradual completion of a customs union as the beginning of a final stage based on a further alignment of 
Turkish economic policies to the "acquis communautaire". The customs union covers industrial and 
processed agricultural products and involves the prohibition between member states of the Community 
and Turkey of customs duties on imports and exports and all charges having equivalent effect as well 
as quantitative restrictions, and also adoption by Turkey of the EC's Common Commercial Policy. 
 
Issues related to the customs union emphasize a perspective of Turkey's deeper integration to EU: free 
circulation of goods between the parties, adoption by Turkey of the EC's common trade policy and 
gradually its other common policies and legislation (competition, intellectual and industrial property rights, public procurement, environment, etc.), Turkey's progressive adaptation to the common 
agricultural policy and co-operation in industrial, monetary, energy, environmental, scientific and 
cultural fields. 
 
3 - Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
 
An another important component of the fulfilling the acquis dimension is the willingness and the 
capacity to take up all the operations and rights in the Common Foreign and Security Policy within the 
European Union. 
 
On one hand Turkey, in contrast with the ex-communists countries or neutrals has the long experience 
of being part of the Western block on the world political scene as a member of the Atlantic Alliance. 
She has also become an associate member of the Western European Union, the European Union's 
common security and defence arm. 
 
On the other hand, the political disputes between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and the Egean Sea 
constitute a determinant factor freezing further degrees of integration between the foreign policies of 
the Union and Turkey. 
 
The "Cyprus Linkage" in the further improvement of relations with Turkey is - "unfortunately" 
according to many within the EU - explicitly established by the European Council summit meeting of 
Dublin (June 1993). Thus, today, the Greek government is in a position to veto the customs union 
agreement or at least its fundamental pillars on political and financial cooperation in total accordance 
with the fourteen other member states. 
 
In discussing the Cyprus question, Turkey is conscious that she has nothing to gain in the deadlock. 
For example, there is not an economic motivation like the oil factor in the Gulf conflict Turkey is 
political and psychological ready to accept any solution which is approved by the islands Turkish 
Community. 
 
The legitimate question to raise in this respect as do the Greek Cypriots, whether Athens considers a 
solution of the question in its interests or sees more benefit for its foreign policy in the continuation of 
the dispute since it is an unquestionable burden limiting Turkey's negotiation power in international 
plate-forms and decreasing the velocity of EU-Turkey relationship. 
 
Another dimension of the problem is the irrationally of the Greek attitude in blocking EU-Turkey 
relations, since it directly serves the interests of ultra-religious and ultra-nationalist Turkish political 
forces and their anti-European political agendas. 
 
 
The EU's passive and ineffective policy towards the conflict in Bosnia is an additional negative doctor 
in her relations with Turkey. The major political forces of center-right and center-left dominating the 
Turkish political life are subject to rhetorical attacks by the anti-EU political forces which point out the 
Bosnian tragedy as an illustration of a so-called "new Christian crusade spirit against other religions". 
 
The customs union has to be evaluated also politically within the debate on Europe's future. 
 
On the one hand, Turkey's economic and political integration into the European Union has accelerated 
while she is trying to become become a pole of stability between unsettled nations of the Balkans, the 
disintegrated Soviet empire and the Middle East. 
 
The political cooperation mechanisms between Ankara and the capitals of the CIS's Turkish republic 
the project of creating in the long run a Central Asian common market, the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC) zone and Turkey's potential role on the economic co-operation and water supply 
in Middle East peace process are to be considered as regional cooperation frameworks that are 
complementary to the pan-European integration process. In this respect, Turkey's essential role, as a stable, democratic and prospering country, is to become a privileged partner between the European 
Union and the Eurasian area. 
 
As the core of the new European architecture, the European Union is faced with the challenge of 
defining a comprehensive and dynamic approach vis-a-vis the new Eurasian region based on an 
integrated cooperation policy. On the other hand, Turkey's economic and political integration into the 
European Union has accelerated while she has become a pole of stability between unsettled nations of 
Eastern Europe, the disintegrated Soviet empire and the perpetually unstable Middle East. Ankara's 
foreign policy seeks a new European order characterized by European Union's central role as economic 
and political core and NATO's leadership on the security field with the WEU as the European pillar of 
the transatlantic line. In this context, Turkey's strategic role, as a democratic and prospering country, is 
to become the interface between the European Union and the troubled republics of Central Asia and 
the Black Sea region. The particularly negative lessons of Bosnian and Caucasian wars show the need 
of the complementarity between the actions of the European Union and Turkey in the new Eurasian 
region. 
 
Therefore, EU's Common Foreign Security Policy can potentially be stronger if it includes Turkey. 
There is also no doubt that, closer ties between both sides of the Egean Sea are not only in the interest 
of Greek and Turkish business worlds but also would provide a more rational spirit for the resolution 
of bilateral disputes within the framework of European integration process and its regional cooperation 
components. 
 
4 - Political and administrative human capital 
 
The third criterion of the "fullling the acquis" dimension is closely linked with the legal and 
administrative set-up. To be able to pursue its interests and enjoy all possible benefits of European 
Union members a member country has to dispose of certain political and administrative elites in a 
stable constitutional system, which are able to play the complex multi-level game, dominating the 
Union's decision-making and implementation This demand for efficient players in the European Union 
system ranges from experts and civil servants to deputies, Euro-MPs and ministers. Besides these 
official actors, political parties, chambers of commerce associations of industries, businessmen clubs, 
trade unions, regional politicians and alike need to get involved in their respective European networks. 
 
Turkey, has a long experience with the EU and dispose at least on the administrative level of an 
experienced staff. Although, she is in a lot better situation with respect to the human capital criterion 
than any other candidate country except the EFTA countries, Turkey is still facing a significant gap to 
fill in this field and needs deeper institutional cooperation with the EU's public and private 
organizations. 
 
Closer ties between the EU and Turkey is also to be considered an effective factor strengthening the 
modern, democratic and free market Turkey against the anti-European trends within her political 
administrative and social structures. 
 
5 - Pubic opinion support 
 
Last but not least, the public opinion of a country can be reluctant vis-a-vis the European integration 
process as in the different cases of France, United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway or Switzerland. 
 
In Turkey the political cleavage over the issue of EU membership opposes the center-left and center-
right parties to the religious Party of Prosperity which represents between 16 to 22 % of the electorate 
and to some marginal far left parties. Nevertheless, recent turbulences in the EU-Turkey relationship 
and the prospects of delays in the customs union process are giving birth to a cross-party, reactionary 
and a de facto alliance against the EU. 
 
3 OPENNESS TOWARDS THE FINALITÉ POLITIQUE 
 The third dimension on the check-list "the openness towards the finalité politique" is not as clear as the 
first two ones, it can less easily be defined in legal terms or with objective indicators but it is 
considered quite essential in Brussels. 
 
It might be called the willingness to share the vocation for further integration. This willingness is 
expressed in the preambles of the Rome and Maastricht treaties as "an ever closer union". 
 
The criteria of this dimension refer: 
 
1- to the widening of the scope of future common policy areas; 
2- to the flexibility in terms of institutional and procedural adaptations and reforms of the present 
Union; 
3- and to the definition by the applicant country of its national destiny as inseparably linked with that 
of the Union. 
 
In the case of the EFTA countries, during the membership negotiations, their political leaders, in order 
to reduce the worries stemming from the eventuality of the emergence of an anti-federalist block as a 
consequence of their membership, have declared many times their commitment to the finalité politique 
of the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
Turkey also has began to pay more attention to this dimension since the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty. In fact, Ankara pays a special attention to not to appear as a natural defender of the Thatcherist 
vision of Europe without however considering a total success of the federalist project as realistic. 
 
4 EUROPEAN IDENTITY 
 
The dimension of what might be called "European identity" is most of the time hidden on the official 
agenda. However it is quite often dominating the informal discussions with a high emotional overtone. 
It concerns the eligibility of an applicant country in view of how far it shares its cultural and historical 
heritage with Europe. 
 
 
Europe's frontiers 
 
The geographical criterion of the European identity is formally stipulated by the article 0 of the Treaty 
on European Union (formerly the article 237 of the Rome Treaty). 
 
Whereas the geographical condition has already stopped an application from Morocco, it was applied 
in favour of Turkey's "eligibility" in the Commissions opinion on the Turkish membership request 
(December 1989). 
 
Quite often however, Turkey's political commitment and geographical location in Europe are not 
considered as satisfactory to meet the condition of European identity, on the basis of arguments related 
to the religious difference. Of course this religiously fundamentalist approach excludes sometimes 
other countries than Turkey from the European integration. There are some who argue that limits of the 
European Union are set by the borderline between Rome and Byzantium. In other words in this optic, 
the European Union should have its frontiers where the Orthodox Europe begins. 
 
* On his side, EC Commissioner Manuel Marin (responsible for external relations with the 
Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, South American and developing Asian countries) made explicit his 
vision of Europe's frontiers during his confirmation hearings before the External Affairs Commission 
of the European Parliament: "The enlargement of the European Union has to be limited to Central and 
Eastern European countries and, in the Mediterranean region, to Cyprus, to Malta and to Turkey who 
will be one day a EU member" (4 January 1995, Brussels). 
 * The same common sense concerning the complex case of Turkey's integration to EU was also 
adopted before the same European Parliament Commission by Commissioner Hans van den Broek 
(responsible for external relations with non-EU member European countries) who emphasized 
"Turkey's strategic importance "and his hope for "the next Association Council of March to seize the 
opportunity to boost the customs union" (5 January 1995, Bussels). 
 
The difference of religion, what we call the "ultimate argument" against Turkey's place in Europe, 
plays a quite significant role for an instinctive pre-selection of possible member countries. It represents 
also an extremely serious threat to the universality of the Western European values. 
 
There is neither political opportunity nor economic interest for the European Union in encouraging a 
Eurasian and Euro-Mediterranean order characterized by religious bipolarization. The continuing 
success of Turkish model is a determinant factor in avoiding such a scenario unless it is excluded by 
the European Union. 
 
Question of image 
 
The difference of religion is also part of a much broader obstacle in Turkey's relations with the 
European Union: 
 
This is the question of Turkey's extremely negative image which deteriorates not only the country's 
relations with its Western partners but also the situation of Western European Turks within their host 
countries. 
 
This image is so strong that it has created on the Western public opinion a mechanism of selective 
perception of what is related to Turkey. 
 
For example, according to opinion surveys among tourists, even a visitor to Turkey perceives generally 
only the women which correspond to his image of Turkish women as being Turkish. All the Turkish 
women who are around on the beaches, in the streets, in the banks, shops etc. are often perceived by 
him as being either foreign tourists or members of a Christian minority or maybe part of a Turkish elite 
which represents only 1-2 percent of the society. 
 
In fact the image of Turkey has two types of causes: 
- One part of the image is due to the exaggeration or generalization of the negative aspects of Turkey; 
- Second part of the image is due to the complete falsification and disinformation on Turkey. 
 
A recent opinion poll realized by the students of a pubic relations school in Brussels among the people 
in the media, the business and the EU institutions shows very well the degree of acknowledge on 
Turkey in the Western public opinion: 
 
It was a true or false test. 
 
A large majority answered "true" for the following statements which are in fact "false": 
- "Turkish is an Arabic language written by Arabic characters." 
- "Only 65% of the Turkish population is Muslim." 
- "Some part of the Turkish legal order is based on the Islamic law". 
- "If a Turkish man is rich enough he can have more than one wife". 
- "Turkish women has obtained the right to vote in 1987 following this application for membership to 
EC". 
- "In Turkey the ethnic origin is mentioned on the identity cards; therefore the discrimination against 
Kurds is easier". 
 
Two of the "true" informations considered as "false" by a majority worth also to be quoted: 
 - "In Turkey the proportion of women among academic lawyers, engineers, bank directors etc. is 
higher than in the majority of other European countries". 
- "In Turkey there are no legal obstacles for a citizen of Kurdish origin to have access to public service, 
to become an MP, a minster of foreign affairs, a president of republic etc...". 
 